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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Joshua Aaron Wickham appeals from his judgment of conviction for eluding the police,
driving while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, and driving without privileges. On
appeal, he asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On June 16, 2016, concerned for her family’s safety, Wickham’s sister contacted police
to inform them that her brother was at her apartment in his car and would not leave. (Trial Tr.,
vol. I, p.177, L.22 – p.179, L.9; p.260, L.10 – p.261, L.9; 7/22/2016 Tr., p.20, Ls.14-22.) She
gave an officer a description of Wickham’s car, a blue Chevy Lumina. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p.180,
Ls.6-12; p.262, L.22 – p.263, L.8.) The officer looked up Wickham’s information and learned
that Wickham’s driving privileges had been suspended. (Id., p.179, L.4 – p.180, L.1.) The
officer then responded to the scene where he located a vehicle matching the description leaving
the residence. (Id., p.181, L.3 – p.182, L.19.)
He activated his overhead lights, attempting to pull over the Chevy Lumina. (Id., p.182,
Ls.20-24.) Though Wickham saw the police lights and knew officers were trying to pull him
over, he sped away, almost colliding with a semi-truck and then cutting off another vehicle as he
forced his way onto westbound Chinden Boulevard during rush hour. (Id., p.182, L.20 – p.185,
L.8; 7/22/2016 Tr., p.16, Ls.4-13.) The officer observed the Lumina driving down the shoulder
before it cut across the two lanes of heavily congested traffic and raced down the center turn lane
at speeds in excess of 70 miles per hour. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p.185, L.9 – p.187, L.2; 7/22/2016 Tr.,
p.16, Ls.14-17.) The speed limit at that juncture is 35 miles per hour. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p.188,
Ls.4-6.) Concerned that the Lumina’s reckless driving would likely result in an accident, the
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officer broke off pursuit and lost sight of the vehicle as it approached Kent Street. (Id., p.189,
L.20 – p.190, L.22.)
The officer continued to drive west on Chinden Boulevard and, eleven minutes later, as
he reached Glenwood, he received a call from a small consignment store reporting that a vehicle
matching the description of the Lumina had stopped there. (Id., p.203, L.2 – p.204, L.1; p.348,
L.6 – p.349, L.3.) The officer responded to the consignment store, locating the now unoccupied
vehicle, still running, that had earlier eluded him. (Id., p.205, L.4 – p.206, L.1; p.352, Ls.3-20.)
The officer found Wickham nearby and took him into custody. (Id., p.206, L.19 – p.208, L.24.)
It appeared that Wickham was under the influence of drugs—his pupils were fixed and dilated
and he was sweating profusely even though it was a relatively cool day. (Id., p.209, L.9 – p.210,
L.3.) Wickham was placed under arrest. (Id., p.233, L.23 – p.234, L.7.) A drug recognition
expert was requested who, after conducting an evaluation, determined that Wickham was under
the influence of a CNS stimulant and cannabis. (Id., p.219, L.18 – p.220, L.1; p.400, Ls.16-23;
p.441, L.18 – p.443, L.5; 7/22/2016 Tr., p.16, L.18 – p.17, L.14.) Lab tests later confirmed that
Wickham had used methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p.27, L.16 – p.28, L.2.)
The state charged Wickham with felony eluding the police, misdemeanor driving while
under the influence, and driving without privileges. (R., pp.48-49.) Initially, Wickham pleaded
guilty to the first two counts pursuant to an agreement with the state under which it agreed not to
file charges for intimidating a witness or file a persistent violator enhancement, and the parties
agreed to probation on Count I and open sentencing on Count II, but concurrent sentences. (R.,
pp.55-57; 7/22/2016 Tr., p.8, Ls.2-24; p.15, L.18 – p.17, L.23.) However, after reviewing the
presentencing materials, the district court ultimately rejected the plea agreement and allowed
Wickham to withdraw his guilty plea. (8/9/2016 Tr., p.24, L.19 – p.25, L.24.)
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The state filed an information part II, charging Wickham with being a persistent violator
of the law. (R., pp.81-82.) Wickham filed a motion to suppress the pretrial identification from
one of the state’s witnesses (R., pp.87-93), which was granted (R., pp.123-31).

The case

proceeded to trial. (R., pp.183-94.) At the close of trial, the jury found Wickham guilty on all
counts (R., pp.229-31; Trial Tr., vol. II, p.114, Ls.3-21), and Wickham admitted the persistent
violator enhancement (Trial Tr., vol. II, p.119, L.20 – p.122, L.18).
The district court entered judgment against Wickham and sentenced him to eight years
with three years fixed on the felony charge, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.240-43.) Wickham
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.245-47.)
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ISSUE
Wickham states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying the motion for a mistrial?
(Appellant’s brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Wickham failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion for a mistrial?
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ARGUMENT
Wickham Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied
His Motion For A Mistrial
A.

Introduction
During direct examination, in response to the prosecutor’s question, “why is it that you

wanted to tell [the police] about [her brother’s] vehicle?” Wickham’s sister responded, “Because
I would rather my brother be in jail than be dead on the streets....” (Trial Tr., vol. I, p.264,
Ls.15-20.) Defense counsel objected and asked to address the court outside of the presence of
the jury. (Id., p.264, Ls.21-23.) During the subsequent discussion with the district court,
Wickham on appeal claims his attorney “made a motion for mistrial.” (Appellant’s brief, p.7.) 1
The district court did not grant a mistrial. On appeal, Wickham asserts that this was error.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-11.) Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this case,
however, shows no reversible error.

B.

Standard Of Review
Contrary to Wickham’s arguments (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5), the standard of review on

a motion for mistrial is well-established:
The question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his
discretion in light of the circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was
made. Rather, the question must be whether the event which precipitated the
motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the
full record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case,
the “abuse of discretion” standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately
1

If defense counsel made a motion for mistrial, it certainly was not unequivocal. After
expressing concern about the witness’s answers, defense counsel asserted “that we’re in a
position where this case may be mistried at this point” (Trial Tr., vol. I, p.265, Ls.5-22 (emphasis
added)) and, when later questioning why examination of the witness should continue asked,
“What else could we possibly need out of this witness that’s not going to bring us closer to a
mistrial?” (Id., p.267, L.19 – p.268, L.7 (emphasis added)).
5

stated, is one of reversible error. [The Court’s] focus is upon the continuing
impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial
judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed
retrospectively, constituted reversible error.
State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 536-37, 285 P.3d 348, 351-52 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations
omitted).

C.

Assuming That Defense Counsel Actually Made A Motion For Mistrial, The District
Court Did Not Err By Denying Wickham’s Motion
Motions for mistrial are governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1. State v. Barcella, 135

Idaho 191, 197, 16 P.3d 288, 294 (Ct. App. 2000). Under part (a) of that rule, “[a] mistrial may
be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or legal
defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the
defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” I.C.R. 29.1(a). Wickham bears the burden
of showing that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his motion for a
mistrial. State v. Ellis, 99 Idaho 606, 608, 586 P.2d 1050, 1052 (1978); State v. Rodriquez, 106
Idaho 30, 33, 674 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Ct. App. 1983). Wickham has failed to show that his sister’s
statement—that she would rather see her brother in jail than dead on the streets—was error or
that he was deprived of a fair trial.
Before trial began, the parties discussed defense counsel’s concerns surrounding some of
the state’s witnesses and evidence, including an audio recording of the 911 call from Wickham’s
sister. The prosecutor agreed that portions of the audio would be unfairly prejudicial, such as
when she described there being a warrant for Wickham, the fact that he was on probation out of
Mountain Home, his prior drug use, and his associations with “junkies.” (Trial Tr., vol. I, p.16,
L.22 – p.17, L.8.) However, portions of her testimony, such as her personal concerns with her
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brother showing up at her place, uninvited, with strangers and apparently under the influence of
drugs, were relevant. (Id., p.17, Ls.9-22.) The prosecutor explained that, to alleviate defense
counsel’s legitimate concerns, Wickham’s sister would be advised that she could not talk about
Wickham’s criminal history or prior drug use, probation and warrant out of Mountain Home, or
that Wickham had remained in jail since his arrest, but she could testify about his current drug
use. (Id., p.26, L.3 – p.27, L.1.)
On appeal, Wickham asserts that his sister essentially told the jury that he was a drug
addict. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-10.) He claims that, in context, his sister’s “testimony informed
the jury that her brother had a history of drug abuse, so severe that she worried he would end up
‘dead on the streets’ if she did not do something about his behavior.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8.)
He also notes that his sister testified “that she had ‘asked my brother not to come over until he
was sober again.’” (Appellant’s brief, p.6.) Wickham’s personal interpretation of the witness’s
statements, however, is not the most obvious reading of those statements.
At no time did Wickham’s sister claim that he was a drug addict, nor did her testimony
necessarily imply that he had a lengthy history of drug abuse. Rather, her statement that she
“had asked [her] brother not to come over until he was sober again” (an unobjectionable
statement and one to which there was no objection offered) goes directly to her brother’s current
sobriety, which was relevant to this case and not unfairly prejudicial. Wickham’s sister had also
testified that she was concerned for her safety and the safety of her children because her brother
was at her residence. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p.259, L.3 – p.261, L.1.) In light of that context, the jury
was far more likely to infer from Ms. Wickham’s statements the proper—and relevant—meaning
that she feared that she, her family, and even her brother were at a great risk of harm due to his
current lack of sobriety. That is not error.
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This more obvious reading is highlighted by the parties’ bench conference following
defense counsel’s objection. No one interpreted Ms. Wickham’s statements as indicating that
her brother was a drug addict, much less that his addiction was so severe that his family needed
to seek state intervention. (See Trial Tr., vol. I, p.265, L.5 – p.269, L.12.) Rather, the district
court’s central concern appeared to deal directly with the witness talking about finding her
brother in jail rather than dead on the streets. (See id., p.266, Ls.14-19.) As noted above, one of
the things the witness was specifically admonished not to talk about was that her brother was
currently in jail and had been since his arrest. (See id., p.26, L.24 – p.27, L.1.) Ms. Wickham’s
statements were, perhaps, treading a little too closely to that line, though she had not yet crossed
it. In fact, the district court opined that allowing the state to finish its examination of Ms.
Wickham would “probably limit the damage.” (Id., p.267, Ls.3-7.)
Moreover, even had the jury interpreted the witness’s comment that she would “rather
[her] brother be in jail than dead on the streets” as “my brother has an extensive history of drug
abuse with several criminal convictions and probation violations, including a current one out of
Mountain Home,” that still would not result in a mistrial. Error alone is not sufficient to grant a
mistrial; the error must also prejudice the defendant so as to deprive him of the ability to receive
a fair trial. I.C.R. 29.1; see also State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d 128, 136 (Ct.
App. 2008) (“The right to due process does not guarantee the defendant an error-free trial, but
rather a fair one.”). Wickham asserts that his sister’s testimony would be “especially” prejudicial
“based on weak identification evidence,” claiming that, on the element of identity, “[t]he case
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presented to the jury was a close one.” 2 (Appellant’s brief, p.8.) But whether Wickham was a
drug addict, even to the degree that his family had grave concerns that he might not survive
without extreme intervention, does not add anything to the element of identity.
Clearly such information, interpreted in the broad way Wickham suggests, would bolster
the state’s case on the element of drug use, which was necessary to show that Wickham was
driving under the influence. But Wickham did not challenge the fact that, during his interactions
with police, he was under the influence of drugs. Rather, Wickham challenged the state’s case
on the element of whether he (or some unknown third party) had been driving the vehicle. (See
Trial Tr., vol. I, p.169, L.20 – p.170, L.13; vol. II, p.88, Ls.9-21.) And with good reason:
Whether Wickham was the driver of the vehicle was relevant to all of the charges—eluding,
driving under the influence, and driving without privileges—and the evidence on the element
that Wickham was under the influence was overwhelming. (See Trial Tr. vol. I, p.410, L.5 –
p.443, L.5; vol. II, p.18, Ls.4-15; p.27, L.16 – p.28, L.2.)
The standard for determining whether error is harmless is whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the error contributed to the jury’s verdict and “the court must be able to declare a
belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477, 488, 873
P.2d 122, 133 (1994). “An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the Court can
conclude, based upon the evidence and argument presented during the trial, that the jury would
have reached the same result absent the error.” State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 471, 163
P.3d 1175, 1183 (2007). Because the evidence on the only element to which Ms. Wickham’s
2

The element of identity was, concededly, the weakest part of the state’s case. However, even
on that element, the state submits that the case was not especially close. Rather, it appears that a
witness for the state identified Wickham during the trial proceedings. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p.299,
Ls.6-22.) And this, notwithstanding the highly irregular procedure endorsed by the district court
of having Wickham sit in the gallery during that witness’s testimony. (See id., p.288, Ls.6-14.)
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contested statements could have contributed was overwhelming without her contribution, this
Court may conclude that the witness’s statements had no effect on Wickham’s conviction.
Because they ultimately did not affect Wickham’s conviction, the statements are harmless, and
Wickham has failed to show that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial. 3
Wickham has failed to show that his sister’s testimony, that she “would rather [her]
brother be in jail than be dead on the streets,” introduced error into the proceedings. Even had
the statement introduced error into the proceedings, Wickham has failed to show that the
statement rendered his trial unfair. Wickham has therefore failed to show that the district court
erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial (assuming such a motion was actually made). The
district court should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order denying
Wickham’s motion for a mistrial.
DATED this 16th day of March, 2018.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer_________________________
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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Wickham also notes that the district court did not strike the testimony or offer a curative
instruction. (Appellant’s brief, p.10.) But, as he also admits, Wickham never requested that the
court strike the objected-to testimony, nor did Wickham request any curative instructions.
10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16th day of March, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy to:
ELIZABETH A. ALLRED
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer________________________
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
RJS/dd
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